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Judicial Notice of Scientific Facts
Jon C. Kleri*

J

UDICIAL NOTICE

of a certain fact or matter which is before the

court occurs when the court accepts it as true without requiring evidentiary proof.' A court may take cognizance of a
fact when it is within the general or common knowledge of well
informed persons. 2 For example, in South and North Alabama
Railroad Company v. Wood,3 the court held that various factors
including the flow of water, the alternation of the seasons, the
difference between night and day, seed and harvest time, the
operation of mechanical power, and matters of similar nature
are so generally known by all men that they need not be proved.
The test of "universal notoriety" 4 is commonly applied by the
court in order to justify acceptance of a certain fact as being
within the area of common knowledge. 5
The practical purpose of judicial notice is to dispense with
the necessity of taking proof to establish a well known or accepted fact or proposition. 6 However, courts are not bound to
take judicial notice of matters of fact. Their acceptance or rejection is dependent upon the nature and scope of the subject
matter as it relates to the issues in any given case in conjunction with the overall justice applicable to the matter.7 A court
will not take judicial notice of a fact where there is doubt or uncertainty regarding its acceptance or notoriety.8
* B.A., Western Reserve University; Probation Officer, Cleveland Municipal
Court, Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of BaldwinWallace College.
1 9 Wigmore on Evidence 531 (3rd ed. 1940). See also Beardsley v. Irving,
81 Conn. 489, 71 A. 580 (1909).
2 State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 P. 910 (1929).
3 74 Ala. 449, 47 Am. Rep. 819 (1876).
4 See Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37, 23 L. Ed. 200 (1875), patent infringement suit where it was held that the court will take judicial notice of a
matter which is within the common knowledge and use of the people. The
court stated, "facts of universal notoriety need not be proved."
5 1 Schweitzer, Cyclopedia of Trial Practice 488 (1954).
6 State ex rel Schmittou v. City of Nashville, 208 Tenn. 290, 345 S. W. 2d
874 (1961).
7 City of St. Louis v. Niehaus, 236 Mo. 8, 139 S. W. 450 (1911). See Kamo
Electric Cooperative Inc. v. Divke, 296 S. W. 2d 905 (Mo. 1956).
8 Schweitzer, op. cit. supra n. 5, at 489.
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Since judicial notice takes the place of proof, the litigant
should request the court to take cognizance of the fact as being
within the area of common knowledge subject to judicial notice.9
Courts are not required to inform themselves of facts not within
their actual knowledge as the burden of proof cannot be shifted
from the litigant to the court. 10
As a preliminary step the court will determine whether the
fact is within the area allowing application of the doctrine of
judicial notice." But a ruling by the court that judicial notice
will be taken of a certain fact is not conclusive, as the matter is
merely accepted as being true without requiring the party to
prove it by means of evidence. 12 Since the opposing party is
allowed to dispute the matter if he feels it is disputable, he
should request the court to allow him to cross-examine in order
to show why the court should not take judicial notice of the
3
matter.'
Among the various subjects of proof which qualify in the
area of judicial notice is the field of science, which includes
accepted and established scientific facts. 4 Before a court may
take judicial notice of a scientific fact it must determine whether
the fact has been accepted as dependable and reliable within the
scientific community, 5 that is, the general acceptance of the device, method, technique, or theory from which an established
16
scientific conclusion may be drawn and admitted into evidence.
The court must also determine whether the scientific fact
is so notorious that it is commonly accepted as being true and
9

Bear v. Kenosha County, 22 Wis. 2d 92, 125 N. W. 2d 375 (1963).

10 Holtz v. Babcock, 390 P. 2d 801 (Mont. 1964). See Richardson Ford Sales
v. Cummins, 74 N. M. 271, 393 P. 2d 11 (1964), holding that, "the Supreme
Court will not take judicial notice of proceedings in a lower court."
11 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts 873 (1956). See Shea v. New York,
New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, 316 F. 2d 838 (1st Cir. 1963).
12 Ex parte Samaha, 130 Cal. App. 16, 19 P. 2d 839 (1933).
'3 12 Belli, Trial and Tort Trends 181 (1962).
See also Macht v. Hecht Co.,
191 Md. 98, 59 A. 2d 754 (1948), where the court held that even though
judicial notice permits the court to dispense with proof of a self evident
fact the opponent may still dispute the fact if he believes it is disputable.
See also Scheufler v. Contintenal Life Insurance Co., 350 Mo. 886, 169 S. W.
2d 359 (1943), where the court held, "The taking of judicial notice of a matter is not necessarily more than a prima facie recognition of the matter,
and does not import that the matter is indisputable."
14 Wigmore on Evidence, Students Textbook 480 (1935).
15 Belli, op. cit. supra n. 13.
16 Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence 130 (1961).
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therefore not subject to intelligent dispute. 7 This is based upon
the principle that the scientific fact is known well enough to be
accepted as common knowledge, thereby allowing the court to
take judicial notice of it and dispense with the requirement of
proof to establish the fact or proposition'
Even though some
persons may disagree with the validity of a scientific conclusion,
courts will take judicial notice of the accuracy of a given scientific conclusion as long as it is sufficiently notorious to be generally accepted by ordinary persons. 19
Courts have traditionally applied the test of general acceptance as pronounced in the case of Frye v. United States, 20 as a
standard to adjudge the validity and acceptability of the scientific principle. 21 The litigant should establish a foundation for
the admission of a scientific principle which has not been judicially noticed because of lack of general acceptance within the
scientific community. 22 The proponent can do this by establishing the scientific acceptance of the finding; by proving the reliability of the test; by showing that any scientific device used
was functioning properly; and by showing that the technician or
operator of the device possessed sufficient experience and skill
2
rendering him capable to conduct the scientific test. '

Expert testimony is not necessarily a prerequisite for the
taking of judicial notice. 24 Some courts, e.g., California, take
notice of acts constituting malpractice, as did the California
court in the case of Agnew v. Los Angeles.25 In Barham v.
1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 4-5 (1961).
1 Jones, Evidence 225 (5th ed. 1958).
19 2 Conrad, Modern Trial Evidence 201 (1956).
20 293 F. 1013 (D. C. Cir. 1923), here the court had to determine the admissibility of the results of a "lie detector test." The court in referring to
the standard of acceptability stated in part, "Just when a scientific principle of discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a wellrecognized scientific principle or discovery the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
21 Richardson, op. cit. supra n. 16, at 132.
22 Id., at 133.
IT

'8

23

Id.

24 3 Averbach, Handling Accident Cases 39 (1960).

97 Calif. App. 2d 557, 218 P. 2d 66 (1950), California courts are permitted
to infer malpractice by taking judicial notice that the failure to utilize
X-rays as aiding in the diagnosis of bone fractures constitutes poor medical
25

practice.
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Widing,2 6 the court took judicial notice that the failure to sterilize surgical instruments may result in a serious2 7infection, thus
inferring negligence on the part of the physician.
A court will take judicial notice of scientific facts which
include scientific developments, the laws of nature, 2 and the
laws of physics and mathematics. 29 But a court will not take
judicial notice of scientific facts which are mere possibilities and
are not within the realm of general acceptance in the scientific
30
community.
The following cases, categorized under arbitrarily selected
subject headings, have been chosen to illustrate the applicability
and usefulness of the doctrine of judicial notice. But, it should
be noted that this is a mere sample of some areas and therefore
does not include all of the voluminous field of scientific facts
subject to judicial notice by the court.
Scientific Tests and Devices
Automobiles-Radar
a. Defendant appealed from a conviction which was based
upon a reading obtained from a radar speedmeter. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey upheld the conviction, ruling that the
reading was admissible as evidence without independent expert
testimony by electrical engineers as long as the device was tested
31
by the police and was in operating condition.
b. In an Ohio case involving a similar factual situation, the
court held that expert testimony explaining the scientific principles of the device was not necessary to admit the reading ob32
tained from the device into evidence.
Intoxication Tests
a. In upholding a conviction for driving while under the
influence of alcohol, the court held that the conviction was justified on the basis of a reading obtained by use of a "drunkometer." In the past, expert testimony was needed to establish
210 Cal. 206, 291 P. 173 (1930).
Averbach, op. cit. supra n. 24.
28 Conrad, op. cit. supra n. 19, at 200.
26
27

29 Id. at 201.

30 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence 141 (12th ed. 1955).
31 State v. Dantonio, 18 N. J. 570, 115 A. 2d 35 (1955).
82 City of East Cleveland v. Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N. E. 2d 630 (1958).
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a scientific conclusion, but this is no longer necessary since the
"drunkometer" is accepted as scientifically accurate and reliable
33
to determine the alcohol content of the blood.
b. In an Ohio case involving a conviction for driving while
under the influence of alcohol, the court took judicial notice of
34
the reliability of a blood, urine or breath test.

Blood Grouping Tests
In a bastardy proceeding where the defendant was acquitted on the results of a blood test, the court held that it would
take judicial notice of the accuracy of blood grouping tests.35
Explosives-Electricity-Lightning
Gasoline
a. Plaintiff sued the operator of a dry cleaning plant who
had gasoline storage tanks on property adjoining plaintiff's property. The court held for the plaintiff, declaring that judicial notice would be taken of the fact that gasoline is of a dangerous
36
and explosive nature.
b. In a personal injury action where plaintiff was injured
from the explosion of natural gas while a gas company workman
was searching for a defect in a pipe in plaintiff's home, the court
ruled that it is common knowledge that the injury sustained by
plaintiff was not a result of spontaneous combustion, but of an
intervening agency, the lighted lamp of plaintiff, which caused
37
the explosion.
Electricity
a. In an accident case, the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio
held that the court would take judicial notice of the scientific
38
fact that a traffic light bulb is liable to burn out at any time.
b. In a wrongful death action where men were electrocuted
while installing a television antenna which came into contact
with a municipality's high voltage wire, the court held that it is
33

State v. Johnson, 42 N. J. 146, 199 A. 2d 809 (1963).

34 State v. Szefcyk, 91 Ohio Law Abs. 66, 191 N. E. 2d 238 (1963).
35 State v. Gray, 76 Ohio Law Abs. 393, 145 N. E. 2d 162 (1957).
36

Whittemore v. Baxter Laundry Co., 181 Mich. 564, 148 N. W. 437 (1914).

37 McGahan v. Indianapolis Natural Gas Co., 140 Ind. 335, 37 N. E. 601

(1894). This case is referred to in the later case of Indianapolis St. Ry. Co.
v. Schmidt, 35 Ind. App. 202, 71 N. E. 663 (1904).
38 Thompson v. Cooper, 43 Ohio Op. 182, 95 N. E. 2d 796 (1950).
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common knowledge that electric current flows through a con9

ductor.3

c. Judgment was rendered for plaintiffs (children ages six
to eight) who were injured when they came into contact with
an electrically charged rail of an electrical railroad. Expert
testimony was not required because the nature of electricity is
40
a scientific fact of which the court will take judicial notice.
d. In a case involving injury to the plaintiff when electricity supposedly jumped to his hand from an insulated wire
twenty-one inches away, the court ruled against the plaintiff,
holding that it is a scientific fact that this was impossible, since
the current would jump to the grounded metal only one inch
41
away rather than to plaintiff's hand.
Lightning
a. The court refused to take judicial notice in a workmen's
compensation action where plaintiff's husband was killed by
lightning which struck him while he was using a metal rake
in his work chores. The court ruled that when there is a difference of opinion by experts as to scientific principles and deduc42
tions the court may not take judicial notice.
Medicine-Health and Hygiene
Medicine
a. In an action against a physician who punctured cysts
located on the ovaries of a woman upon whom he was performing an authorized appendectomy, the court held that there was
no evidence of negligence on the part of the physician even
though an infection later developed. The court took judicial
notice of the fact that failure to operate upon the cysts would
have resulted in future illness to the patient. In so doing, the
court held that judicial notice can be taken of any fact in any
field of science which is so notorious that it is not subject to
reasonable dispute.

43

Fowler v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 321 F. 2d 566 (6th Cir. 1963).
Mullen v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill. App. 2d 103, 178 N. E. 2d 670
(1961).
41 Coughlin v. Great Western Power Co., 183 Cal. 548, 191 P. 920 (1920).
42 Mixon v. Kalman, 133 N. J. 113, 42 A. 2d 309 (1945).
39
40

43

Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956).
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b. In a case against a physician for administering chloroform to a pregnant woman who died during the performance of
an illegal abortion, the court took judicial notice of the harmful
effects of chloroform but allowed the defendant to produce evi44
dence to show an absence of criminal intent.
c. In an action against the owner of a shoe factory by an
employee who claimed he contacted pneumoconiosis while in
defendant's employ, the court refused to take notice of this lung
disease because of the conflict of medical authorities as to the
45
causes of pneumoconiosis.
d. An indictment charging defendants with the sale of cocaine, morphine and morphine sulphate, but failing to allege that
the drugs were derivatives of opium leaves, resulted in a verdict
for the defendants when the court refused to take judicial no46
tice that narcotics were derivatives of certain leaves.
Diseases
a. Animal. Plaintiff sued to recover damages for breach of
warranty based upon the purchase of cows from defendant. The
cows died of tick fever. The court held for the defendant noting
that judicial notice may be taken of the causes of the fever but
not of the time required for the disease to develop into a fatal
stage. 47 For a court to take judicial notice of scientific facts they
must be so notorious that they are a part of the general knowledge of men.

48

b. Trees. Defendant was convicted for failing to destroy
trees which were affected by "peach yellows." The court held
that it would take judicial notice of the damaging effect caused
by the disease known as "peach yellows." 49

Health and Hygiene
a. Plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for
breach of warranty based upon his contacting trichinosis from
44 State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 105 N. E. 75 (1913).
45 Genesco Inc. v. Greeson, 105 Ga. App. 798, 125 S. E. 2d 786 (1962).

United States v. Hammers, 241 F. 542 (S. D. Fla. 1917). See Barr v.
State, 28 Okla. Crim. Rep. 392, 231 P. 322 (1924), where the court took judicial notice that morphine sulphate is a narcotic drug.
47 Ramey and Hamon v. Hamilton and White, 234 S. W. 229 (Tex. App.
1921).
46

48

Ibid.

49

State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 A. 80 (1897).
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pork purchased from defendant's store. Defendant contended
that pork must be cooked to 137 degrees fahrenheit in order to
be considered as being properly cooked. The court agreed, ruling that judicial notice would be taken of the scientific fact that
one cannot contact trichinosis from pork cooked to 137 degrees
fahrenheit. 50 In another trichinosis case the court took judicial
notice of similar facts maintaining that these facts have been
51
The court
established by authorities in the field of science.
held that a scientific fact does not have to be known by everyone in order for the court to take judicial notice but that authorities in the particular field of science must be agreed to the
fact.

52

b. In a case where a state statute prohibited the introduction of oleomargarine, the court ruled that this food was pure
and, therefore, the court could take judicial notice of the com53
position of said food product.
c. A recent case which challenged the constitutionality of
a Board of Health regulation requiring that all milk be pasteurized was decided in favor of the Board of Health. The court held
that judicial notice could be taken of the scientific fact that
54
harmful bacteria is found in raw milk.
d. Fluoridation of water as a health aid has been accepted
as being within the area of scientific facts of which the court may
take judicial notice. 55
e. Courts have taken judicial notice that vaccination is a
preventive of smallpox, 56 and of the composition of the vaccine
57
as a scientific fact.
f. Where the defendant failed to obtain a contract from the
city to haul garbage, the court took judicial notice of the scientific fact that animal and vegetable matter decay in a short pe50 Golaris v. Jewel Tea Co., 22 F. R. D. 16 (N. D. Ill. 1958).

51 Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 87 N. E. 2d 30 (1949).
52

Ibid.

53

Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 S. Ct. 757 (1898).

54 Schlenker v. Board of Health, 171 Ohio St. 23, 167 N. E. 2d 920 (1960).

55 Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N. E. 2d 609 (1955).
56 Viemeister v. White, 179 N. Y. 235, 72 N. E. 97 (1904).
57

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358 (1905).
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riod of time. 56 Matters of hygiene are scientific facts which are
of common knowledge and are therefore generally known. 59
g. When the court revoked the permit of a hog ranch operator, it held that it would take judicial notice of the scientific
fact that rats and flies are a detriment to the health of human
beings. 60
Laws of Nature
a. In an action by plaintiff for injuries to his foot which
was caught in a defective sidewalk having a hole in it three to
four inches wide, the court ruled that evidence that one could
catch a foot in a hole this size should not be rejected as a
61
physical impossibility.
b. In a manslaughter case, the Supreme Court of Illinois
took judicial notice that there are certain limitations on human
eyesight. The court disregarded testimony by witnesses for the
prosecution who claimed ability to identify the accused by a
mere glance under adverse weather conditions, at night, and at
a great distance as being contrary to general knowledge and
experience.

62

c. The court took judicial notice of the violent nature of
"Hurricane Hazel." 03 By this action the court maintained that
the violence and destructiveness of a natural phenomena such as
a hurricane was within the realm of common knowledge. 64
58 Valley Spring Hog Ranch Co. v. Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 220 S. W. 1 (1920).
59 Ibid.

Cantrell v. Board of Sup'rs. of Los Angeles County, 87 Cal. App. 2d 471,
197 P. 2d 218 (1948).
61 Marley v. Arkansas City, 135 Kan. 688, 11 P. 2d 704 (1932), here the
court stated, "To disregard testimony as contrary to settled laws of nature,
testimony must be shown to be plainly incompatible with physical laws of
undisputable physical facts." See also Sheppard v. Wichita Ice and Cold
Storage Co., 82 Kan. 509, 108 P. 819 (1910), which held for plaintiff who
sued for damages for injuries sustained when he fell into an open tank of
hot water during his employment. This later case turned upon the issue
of how dark it was when the accident occurred. The court ruled that the
testimony by plaintiff's witnesses was not such as to be false or improbable.
62 People v. Bentley, 357 Ill. 82, 191 N. E. 230 (1934).
63 Smith v. City of Kinston, 249 N. C. 160, 105 S. E. 2nd 648 (1958).
64 Ibid.
60
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Laws of Physics
a. In a 1964 Ohio case,6 5 plaintiff, an employee of defendant's railroad, alleged that he was injured when the engineer
made an emergency stop to avoid colliding with another train,
thereby causing him to be thrown to the ground from the caboose upon which he was riding. The trial court directed the
jury to return a verdict for the defendant, maintaining that a
train traveling at a speed of only three to four miles per hour
would not cause a significant jerk even if it came to an abrupt
stop.
The plaintiff appealed and the court of appeals recognized
that it is established that a court may take judicial notice of a
law of physics. However, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the evidence raised
a jury question as to whether the train did come to such a sudden stop as to cause plaintiff to be thrown to the ground from
the caboose. 0 The court of appeals, then, refused to take judicial
notice that a train traveling so slowly could not cause a sudden
jerk when stopped suddenly.
b. There have been numerous "sudden jerk" cases, such as
the one above, involving common carriers. One of these involving the injury to a passenger in an overcrowded streetcar resulted in judgment for the plaintiff when the court ruled that
the plaintiff did not have to prove that the jerk was unnecessary
and unusual. 7 The defendant contended that it was common
knowledge that streetcars do not start in such a way as to
throw passengers about and cause injuries to them. The court
disagreed holding that plaintiff's failure to prove this as common
68
knowledge did not justify a directed verdict for the defendant.
c. In another streetcar case, the court ruled that the fall
sustained by the plaintiff resulting from the unusual jerk of the
streetcar amounted to positive testimony as to the nature of the
movement of the streetcar.

69

65 Alexander v. N. Y. C. R.R. Co., 197 N. E. 2d 822 (Ohio App. 1964), here
the court held, "A court may take judicial notice of matters of science
which would include a law of physics."

66

Ibid.

Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Hunt, 116 Ohio St. 291, 156 N. E. 133 (1927).
68 Ibid.
69 Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Merk, 124 Ohio St. 596, 180 N. E. 51 (1932).
67

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/15

10

15 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)

Jan., 1966

d. In another case three years later, the court ruled that
the plaintiff must show that the jerk was unusual, e.g., sudden,
forceful, or violent in order to prove negligence. 70 Thus, this
court was holding that a "mere jerk" was not evidence of negli71
gence on the part of the common carrier.
e. Then, in 1939, an Ohio Appeals Court affirmed the judgment rendered for the plaintiff who was injured when a bus in
which she was riding stopped with a sudden jerk. The court
cited Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Merk,1 2 and ruled that the sudden
jerk amounted to positive testimony as to the nature of the
movement of the streetcar.

73

f. In a wrongful death action where the deceased was killed
when railroad cars suddenly stopped and threw him to the
ground, the court ruled that the evidence presented a jury ques74
tion in view of the testimony regarding the sudden stop.

g. Another case involving the injury of a bus passenger
cited Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Hunt,75 and held that the sudden jerk
was an inference of negligence because a sudden jerk is not
normal in the operation of the vehicle.7 6
h. In Spreng v. Flaherty7 7 the court refused to take judicial
notice that an automobile traveling at a certain speed can be
stopped within a certain distance, since evidence showed that
adverse weather conditions prevailed and could have affected
the distance in which the automobile could stop.
The courts have held in these cases involving the laws of
physics that judicial notice could not be taken of a fact if such
fact was found to be operating in association with other facts
that might cause a contrary conclusion. 78 In these cases the
matters at hand have been left to the decision of the jury.
70

Yager, Recr. v. Marshall, 129 Ohio St. 584, 196 N. E. 375 (1935).

71

Ibid.

Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Merk, supra n. 69.
73 Fristoe v. Dayton Street Transit Co., 29 Ohio Law Abs. 351 (1939).
74 Sunderland v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Co., 319 F. 2d 809 (3rd
Cir. 1963).
75 Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Hunt, supra n. 67.
76 Miller v. Warren Transportation Co., 93 Ohio Law Abs. 213, 197 N. E.
2d 562 (1963).
77 40 Ohio App. 21, 177 N. E. 528 (1931). See State v. Ward, 105 Ohio App. 1,
72

150 N. E. 2d 465 (1957).
78 IbicL
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Conclusion
The general purpose of the doctrine of judicial notice of
scientific facts is to dispense with the need to produce evidence
to prove a fact or facts which are known to all persons.7 9 The
question arises, though, as to who is to say that a fact is so
notorious as to fall into the realm of common knowledge. According to Wigmore, "The law of evidence, applied by the court
to particular instances will tell us." 80
The laws of evidence maintain that in order for the court to
take judicial notice of scientific facts they must be part of the
general knowledge of men8 l or must be agreed upon by reputable men in a particular field of science beyond reasonable dispute.8 2 For judges to determine the degree of consensus on a
particular scientific fact they may refer to any reputable and
recognized reference sources.
79

Wigmore, op. cit. supra n. 14, at 479.

80 Ibid.

81 Raney and Hamon v. Hamilton and White, supra n. 47.
82 Nichetta v. National Tea Co., supra n. 51.
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